




















Food Consumption and Nutrition Division 
 
International Food Policy Research Institute 
2033 K Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20006 U.S.A. 
(202) 862–5600 















FCND Discussion Papers contain preliminary material and research results, and are circulated prior to a full 
peer review in order to stimulate discussion and critical comment. It is expected that most Discussion Papers 
will eventually be published in some other form, and that their content may also be revised. 
 
 
IN-KIND TRANSFERS AND HOUSEHOLD FOOD 
CONSUMPTION:  IMPLICATIONS FOR  
  TARGETED FOOD PROGRAMS IN BANGLADESH
Carlo del Ninno and Paul A. Dorosh   ii
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the impact of wheat transfers and cash incomes on wheat 
consumption and wheat markets. Using propensity score-matching techniques, the total 
marginal propensity to consume (MPC) for wheat is, on average, 0.33, ranging from 
essentially zero for Food For Work (a program with large transfers) to 0.51 for Food For 
Education. Econometric estimates indicate that the MPC for small wheat transfers to poor 
households is approximately 0.25, while the MPC for wheat out of cash income is near 
zero. This increase in demand for wheat reduces the potential price effect of three major 
targeted programs involving small rations (Food For Education, Vulnerable Group 
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In the ongoing debate on the merits of food and cash transfers, one key factor is 
the extent to which food transfers have a greater positive impact on food consumption 
than do cash transfers of an equal monetary value.
1 In other words, to what extent is the 
marginal propensity to consume food greater for in-kind transfers than for cash transfers? 
The magnitude of this effect is important, because food transfer programs incur high 
costs in handling and transportation, thus making them less efficient in terms of the cost 
incurred per unit value of food or cash delivered to the target household.
2 Moreover, if 
food transfers do not lead to significant increases in consumption, then market prices of 
food are more likely to be depressed by the increase in supply, to the detriment of local 
producers.  
Traditional neoclassical theory suggests that the size of the transfer matters in 
determining its effect on consumption. If the in-kind transfer is less than the amount of 
the food the household would normally purchase, then it simply replaces cash purchases 
and thus has the same effect as an income transfer.
3 If there are significant transaction 
                                                 
1 Numerous econometric analyses of household consumption data (e.g., Devaney and Fraker 1989; Senauer 
and Young 1986), as well as experimental evidence (Fraker, Martini, and Ohls 1995), have demonstrated 
empirically that the marginal propensity to consume food out of in-kind transfers (in the form of 
commodities or food stamps) is higher than the marginal propensity to consume out of cash income. 
2 The efficiency of cash transfers may not be greater than the efficiency of food transfers if leakages from 
cash transfers are significantly larger than leakages from food transfers. Leakages from Food For Work 
programs in Bangladesh are estimated at about 30 percent (Hossain and Akash 1993; WGTFI 1994; del 
Ninno 2000).  
3 An in-kind transfer that is less than the size of consumption without the transfer is termed an infra-
marginal transfer. See Southworth (1945) and Senauer and Young (1986).  
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costs of reselling food, however, a large in-kind transfer might result in more food 
consumed than a cash transfer of equal value. 
The modern theory of the household suggests that who receives or controls the 
transfer is also important. For example, transfers-in-kind received by female members of 
the household might result in higher levels of household food consumption than do cash 
transfers, particularly if cash transfers are controlled by male members of the household 
(Haddad, Hoddinott, and Alderman 1997). Thus, the characteristics of program 
participants may influence household consumption behavior. 
This paper uses data from a 1998/99 survey of rural households in Bangladesh to 
econometrically estimate marginal propensities to consume (MPCs) out of wheat 
transfers in several distribution programs. The resulting MPCs are then used to calculate 
the potential impacts of these programs on household wheat consumption and wheat 
market prices.
4 
Section 2 provides a brief description of various in-kind distribution programs in 
Bangladesh. Section 3 contains a description of the survey design, and data on household 
characteristics, types and quantities of transfers received, and consumption and sales out 
of transfers. Section 4 presents empirical estimates of the marginal propensity to consume 
wheat out of in-kind transfers, using two alternative methodologies: propensity-score 
matching of consumption of program participants and a “similar” group of 
nonparticipants, and direct econometric estimates of Engel functions. Section 5 examines 
                                                 
4 Earlier analysis by Dorosh and Haggblade (1995) used an assumed MPC for wheat transfers based on data 
on wheat consumption by Food For Work participants; this paper extends that analysis by using 
econometrically estimated measures of marginal propensities to consumer that vary by program.  
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the implications of the results for wheat demand and market prices in Bangladesh. 
Finally, Section 6 presents policy implications and conclusions. 
 
2. FOODGRAIN DISTRIBUTION PROGRAMS IN BANGLADESH 
Table 1 shows distribution of foodgrain through the Public Foodgrain Distribution 
System (PFDS) in 1998/99, a year marked by widespread floods from July through 
September 1998. During the fiscal year, 2.13 million tons of foodgrain were distributed: 
0.53 million tons of rice and 1.60 million tons of wheat. Eighty-eight percent of the 
 
Table 1—Foodgrain distribution by channels, budget and actual 1998/99 (thousand 
tons) 
Budget 1998/99    Actual 1998/99   
Rice  Wheat  Total    Rice  Wheat  Total 
               
Priced Channels               
  Essential Priorities (EP)  124  85  209    127  85  212 
  Open Market Sales (OMS)  200  0  200    2  0  2 
  Fair Price Campaign (FPC)  0  0  0    9  5  14 
  Other Priority (OP)  6  6  12    7  5  12 
  Large Employee Industries (LEI)  0  15  15    0  14  14 
               
Non-Priced Channels               
  Food For Work (FFW)  125  400  525    8  690  698 
  Vulnerable Group Development (VGD)  60  120  180    11  193  204 
  Food For Education (FFE)  150  200  350    60  227  287 
  Test Relief (TR)  40  16  56    37  53  90 
  Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF)  20  10  30    167  297  464 
  Gratuitous Relief (GR)  66  24  90    66  8  74 
               
Others  22  29  51    37  24  61 
               
    Total  813  905  1,718    530  1,603  2,133 




foodgrain was distributed through programs targeted to poor households or those in need 
of emergency relief. The remaining 255 thousand tons was sold at subsidized prices to 
select groups, including the military, or to the poor through Open Market Sales and Fair 
Price Shops.
5  
Substantial food aid inflows in response to the flood situation enabled a large 
increase in public distribution of wheat from an originally planned 905 thousand tons to 
an eventual 1.603 million tons for the July 1998–June 1999 fiscal year. Food For Work 
(FFW) was the largest distribution channel, though this program operates mainly from 
January through May when drier soil conditions permit heavy earthwork. Case studies 
from five FFW sites in 1998 found that in three of the sites, workers were paid in cash 
rather than foodgrain (del Ninno 2000). Similarly, a survey done to collect data on work 
norms for FFW (WFP 1997) found that 50 percent of the workers received payments in 
cash instead of in kind. The second largest program, Food For Education (FFE), a 
program targeted to elementary school-aged children in poor households, in principle 
operates nearly year round, though almost no distribution took place from July through 
December 1998, as FFE was postponed until December 1998 to conserve foodgrain 
stocks for distribution to flood-affected households.
6  
The major channels for government food relief efforts following the flood were 
Gratuitous Relief (GR), designed to provide emergency relief to disaster victims, and 
                                                 
5 The Open Market Sales distribution channel involves subsidized sales of small amounts of grain (about 3 
kilograms) to individuals. A measure of targeting is achieved because prospective buyers must wait in line 
in order to buy the subsidized grain. 
6 The other major targeted program, Vulnerable G roup Development (VGD), targets poor women, 
providing training and a food transfer.  
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Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF), aimed at assisting households over a longer period 
(ultimately, from September 1998 through April 1999). Immediate short-term relief 
through GR was targeted by location. In contrast, the VGF program included all areas of 
the country (both flooded and nonaffected areas), and was administratively targeted to 
poor households through selection by local committees (del Ninno et al. 2001). The size 
of these programs was limited, however, both by available wheat stocks (up through early 
November when government commercial imports and food aid arrivals added to 
government stocks) and the financial cost of the programs (covered to a large extent by 
food aid).
7  
In the initial budget for 1998/99, VGF was only a small program, but it was 
rapidly expanded in August 1998 with an initial distribution of 1.3 million cards that 
entitled the holder to 8 kilograms of rice per month. During August and September, a 
total of 28,500 tons of rice were distributed through this program. At 8 kilograms per 
card, an estimated 1.35 and 2.13 million households received VGF rations in August and 
September, respectively. Almost no wheat was distributed through relief channels in the 
initial months of the flood. At the urging of the World Food Program (WFP), the 
Government of Bangladesh expanded the VGF program to 4 million cards with an 
allotment of 16 kilograms of grain per card, half rice and half wheat in October, and all 
wheat thereafter. 
 
                                                 
7 See del Ninno et al. (2001) for further details on Government of Bangladesh foodgrain distribution in 
1998/99.   
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3. UTILIZATION OF IN-CASH AND IN-KIND TRANSFERS: 
SURVEY EVIDENCE 
The data on household characteristics, expenditures, and transfers are taken from 
a multi-round survey of 757 households in seven flood-affected thanas.
8 The first round 
was conducted from 28 November to 23 December 1998, shortly after the massive floods 
that inundated much of Bangladesh (July–September 1998). The second round was 
conducted from 26 April to 22 May 1999. 
In the immediate post-flood period until the end of November, more than half of 
the people in the sample had received small transfers of rice. In fact, average rice 
transfers were twice the value of wheat transfers (280 taka per household versus 165 taka 
per household). GR (47.9 percent) and VGF (43.0 percent) accounted for 90.9 percent of 
the transfers recorded in the survey. VGF distribution to sample households generally 
included both rice and wheat; GR was mainly rice, though some of the households 
receiving GR received some wheat and cash. Overall foodgrain distribution, and 
especially wheat distribution, was constrained at this time by a shortage of public stocks 
and uncertainties about food aid deliveries (see del Ninno et al. 2001). 
Our analysis focuses, however, on the period after December 1998, when the 
scope of public distribution of foodgrain had greatly expanded, and the value of wheat 
                                                 
8 The seven flood-affected thanas, representing all six divisions of the country, were selected according to 
three criteria: the severity of flood as determined by the Water Board, the percentage of poor people in the 
district in which the  thana is located, and the inclusion in other studies. Households were randomly 
selected using multiple stages probability sampling technique (with the exception of one thana). First, three 
unions per thana were randomly selected, then six villages were randomly selected from each union with 
PPS, then two clusters ( paras) were randomly selected per village. Finally, three households were 
randomly selected in each cluster. As a result, we selected approximately six households per village, 36 per 
union, 108 per thana for a final sample size of 757 households in 126 villages (see del Ninno et al. (2001) 
for a more detailed description of the sampling frame).  
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distribution was much greater than the value of rice distribution. Thus, in the data 
collected in April 1999, 267 out of the 295 households that received transfers received at 
least some of those transfers in wheat (Table 2). In April 1999, as in the previous period, 
households receiving transfers were, on average, poorer than households not receiving 
transfers, as measured by per capita expenditures. In particular, calorie consumption and 
per capita expenditure of households receiving transfers were 93 and 85 percent of those 
of nonreceiving households.  
 
Table 2—Characteristics of households receiving transfers, January to April 1999 
   Receiving    Nonreceiving    All 
   Number  Average    Number  Average    Average 
               
Cash (taka per household)  50  272    698  -    18 
Wheat (taka per household)  267  493    481  -    176 
Rice (taka per household)  192  203    556  -    52 
All (taka per household)  295  625    453  -    247 
               
Household size  295  5.31      5.42    5.38 
Per capita monthly expenditure (taka)  295  597      738    683 
Per capita daily calorie consumption  295  2,415      2,586    2,518 
Number of households    295      453    748 
Source: FMRSP-IFPRI Bangladesh Flood Impact Survey, 1998–1999. 
 
Most households in the sample received wheat transfers mainly through VGF and 
FFE. Nearly all VGF participants received both rice and wheat transfers, though the 
wheat transfers were, on average, nearly twice the value of the rice transfers. Sixty-six 
households, 8.9 percent of the total sample, received FFE transfers, almost exclusively in 
the form of wheat (Table 3).  
 
8
In both rounds, the average value of transfers received was greater for poor than 
for nonpoor households. Nevertheless, del Ninno and Dorosh (2001) have shown that the 
percentage of households receiving GR in the period immediately after the 1998 flood 
was more evenly distributed across expenditure quintiles, though the degree of exposure 
to the flood was a major determinant of participation in GR.  
In the period under consideration, January–May 1999, 54.6 percent of households 
in the lowest expenditure quintile (the poorest 20 percent of the households) received 
transfers, while only 39.8 percent of the households in the top quintile received transfers 
(Table 4). VGF transfers were well-targeted to poorer households; 33.6 percent of the 
households in the lowest expenditure quintile received VGF in the first round, compared 
with 11.8 percent in the top expenditure quintile. FFE appears to have been well-targeted 
to the bottom 60 percent of the expenditure distribution in round 2, though the share of 
households participating in the first quintile (11.2 percent) is very similar to that in the 
third quintile (10.6 percent).  
As shown in Table 5, the average amount of wheat consumption per capita per 
day and the share of calories from wheat were all significantly larger for households 
receiving transfers, compared to households that did not receive transfers. Average per 
capita wheat consumption of households receiving transfers rose dramatically, in part 
because of the larger number of households receiving wheat transfers after January 1999. 
Among those receiving rice, wheat, or cash transfers, the percentage of households 
consuming wheat was 79.3 percent; the average amount of per capita daily quantity of  
  
Table 3—Value of transfers of rice, cash, and wheat, by type, round, and period for receiving households, January to April 
1999 
January to May 1999    January-April    April-May 
Wheat    Rice    Cash    All    All    All 
Program  Number  Value (Tk)    Number  Value (Tk)    Number  Value (Tk)    Number  Value (Tk)   Number Value (Tk)    Number Value (Tk) 
                                   
FFE  63  328    1  375    4  73    66  323    65  306    6  243 
Stipends                    21  111    15  43    8  211 
GR  5  237    4  106    21  111    15  167    13  151    2  270 
TR  1  2,205    2  745    8  111    3  1,281    3  1,230    1  155 
VGF  182  358    182  187    1  150    183  544    183  427    129  167 
VGD  20  593    2  152    8  46    20  609    19  512    13  188 
FFW  17  1,804    1  2,271    3  840    18  1,970    14  2,314    7  438 
Other NG Assist.  1  75    1  20    6  1,183    7  1,027    7  834    3  450 
                                   
Total  267  494    192  203    50  273    295  625    287  530    163  198 
Source: FMRSP-IFPRI Bangladesh Flood Impact Survey, 1998–1999.  
Notes: FFE = Food For Education; GR = Gratuitous Relief; TR = Test Relief; VGF = Vulnerable Group Feeding; VGD = Vulnerable Group Development; FFW = .Food For 
Work. 
 
Table 4—Percentages of households receiving transfers, by type and quintiles, January to April 1999 
Quintile 1    Quintile 2    Quintile 3    Quintile 4    Quintile 5    Total 
Program  Percent  Amount    Percent  Amount    Percent  Amount    Percent  Amount    Percent Amount    Percent  Amount 
                                   
FFE   11.2  369    14.6  284    10.6  324    4.0   354    3.3  298    8.8  323 
Stipends   -  -    2.6  191    2.0  111    2.6   53    6.6  101    2.8  111 
GR   2.0  369    2.0  117    1.3  28    3.3   66    1.3  326    2.0  167 
TR   0.7  438    0.7  150    0.7  3,256    -  -    -  -    0.4  1,281 
VGF   33.6  520    27.2  544    27.8  544    20.5   599    11.8  521    24.5  544 
VGD   6.6  725    2.6  409    2.0  486    2.0   611    -  -    2.7  609 
FFW   3.9  1,461    3.3  2,779    1.3  3,754    1.3   235    2.0  1,609    2.4  1,970 
Other NG Assist.   -  -    2.6  781    2.0  1,355    -  -    -  -    0.9  1,027 
                                   
Total   54.6  607    48.3  664    41.1  721    27.2  574    23.7  482    39.5  625 
Number of households  152      151      151      151      152      747   
Source: FMRSP-IFPRI Bangladesh Flood Impact Survey, 1998–1999. 
Notes: FFE = Food For Education; GR = Gratuitous Relief; TR = Test Relief; VGF = Vulnerable Group Feeding; VGD = Vulnerable Group Development; 






Table 5—Households consuming food commodities, average food budget share, and calorie shares, by receiving 
households, January to April 1999 






































                             
Rice  100.00  433.82  39.69  62.54    100.00  473.66  36.52  64.47    100.00  457.95  37.77  63.71 
Wheat  79.32  112.01  8.40  16.28    64.46  86.33  5.25  10.82    70.32  97.75  6.65  13.25 
Other cereals  31.19  11.32  1.29  1.80    41.72  12.55  1.42  1.80    37.57  12.15  1.37  1.80 
Pulses  91.19  26.76  3.98  3.82    92.72  27.58  3.56  3.64    92.11  27.26  3.73  3.71 
Oil  98.98  7.86  3.00  3.00    99.12  9.83  3.18  3.59    99.06  9.06  3.11  3.36 
Vegetables  100.00  243.22  14.67  6.71    100.00  299.25  15.01  7.52    100.00  277.15  14.88  7.20 
Meat  40.00  16.29  6.30  0.72    52.98  23.90  7.69  1.05    47.86  21.39  7.23  0.94 
Egg  62.37  5.46  2.16  0.39    75.28  6.48  2.05  0.43    70.19  6.13  2.09  0.42 
Milk  58.98  49.32  3.88  1.26    71.30  56.39  4.25  1.43    66.44  53.91  4.12  1.37 
Fruits  77.29  69.51  6.04  1.89    88.52  104.40  7.55  2.53    84.09  91.75  7.00  2.30 
Fishes  93.56  24.33  6.86  1.29    96.69  32.33  7.66  1.58    95.45  29.24  7.35  1.47 
Spices  100.00  24.52  4.30  1.40    99.34  26.46  4.43  1.53    99.60  25.69  4.38  1.48 
Snac/etc.  89.15  28.24  5.12  4.37    94.04  36.48  5.95  5.31    92.11  33.33  5.63  4.95 
Tea/Bete  79.32  11.13  6.10  0.42    80.57  13.45  5.65  0.41    80.08  12.54  5.83  0.41 
Prepared  24.41  35.43  4.23  5.14    27.15  24.40  2.73  3.09    26.07  28.47  3.28  3.85 
                             
No. of households  295          453          748   
   
Total household food expenditure  2,420          3,182          2,821 
 
  Calories per capita per day    2,415          2,586          2,518 









wheat consumed was 112 grams per capita per day and the share of calories derived from 
wheat was 16.3 percent.  
Wheat consumption among non-receiving households rose as well in this period, 
most likely due to greater wheat availability and lower wheat prices after the wheat 
harvest in March and April 1999; 64.5 percent consumed wheat, with average per capita 
daily quantity consumed of 86.33 grams per capita per day, and the share of calories 
derived from wheat was 10.8 percent.  
In comparison with wheat consumption, rice consumption has been more stable 
across the two rounds of the survey, with 100 percent of households consuming rice in 
both periods. Nevertheless, households receiving transfers still consume smaller 
quantities of rice (434 grams versus 474 grams per capita per day) with respect to 
nonparticipants, reflecting the fact that they are generally poorer and consume more 
wheat.  
The difference in wheat consumption between wheat consumers who received and 
consumed wheat transfers and those who did not receive wheat transfers in April/May 
1999 was significant (Figure 1). Average current wheat consumption of the 35.7 percent 
of the households who received a wheat transfer during the previous four months was 
13.8 kilograms per household per month, compared to 9.0 kilograms per household per 
month for the 64.3 percent of households who did not receive a wheat transfer during that 
period. This 35.7 percent includes nonconsumers who received wheat transfers.   
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Figure 1—Household participation in wheat transfer program and wheat 










































 Consumption of wheat in last reporting period (kg/hh/month). 
 b Wheat transfers consumed in last reporting period (kg/hh/month). 
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Considering only those households who consumed wheat in April/May 1999, 
average wheat consumption for the 29.0 percent of households who received a wheat 
transfer in the previous four months was 17.0 kilograms per household per month 
compared with 14.0 kilograms per household per month for wheat-consuming households 
not receiving a wheat transfer. Thus, among households that consumed wheat in 
April/May 1999, consumption per household of those receiving wheat transfers was 21.4 
percent greater than the consumption per household of those not receiving a transfer in 
the previous four months. Though wheat-consuming households that received a wheat 
transfer in the previous four months consumed 9.5 kilograms per household per month of 
transfer wheat in the survey period, their consumption was 3.0 kilograms per household 
per month greater than wheat-consuming households that did not receive a transfer.  
The observed difference in wheat consumption between households receiving a 
wheat transfer and those not receiving a wheat transfer is not due to sales of the wheat 
transfers. As shown in Table 6, sales out of wheat transfers are small. Only 15.7 percent 
of households receiving a wheat transfer in round 2 sold their wheat, and, on average, 
sales by these households were only 190 taka, equal to 42.1 percent of the amount of the 
transfer. What accounts for the small increase in wheat consumption for households 
receiving transfers? Households receiving wheat transfers purchase less wheat than they 
would if they did not receive a wheat transfer, so their wheat consumption increases by 





Table 6—Utilization of transfers of wheat and rice, January to April 1999 
   Households receiving transfers    Households selling transfers    Households consuming transfers 
Program 
Number of 
households  Average  Amount   
Number of 
households  Average  Amount 
Sale 
price   
Number of 
households  Average  Amount  Price
a 
    (kilograms)  (taka)      (kilograms)  (taka)        (kilograms)  (taka)   
Rice                           
  FFE  0  0  0    0  0  0  -    0  0  0  0.0 
  GR  3  14  192    0  0  0  -    3  14  192  13.7 
  VGF  176  16  217    3  4  39  9.7    171  15  202  13.3 
  VGD  1  70  833    0  0  0  -    1  70  833  11.9 
  FFW                           
                           
    Total  180  16  220    3  4  39  10.0    175  16  2,065  13.2 
                           
Wheat                           
  FFE  62  51  448    15  17  136  7.8    59  49  375  7.7 
  GR  4  37  324    0  0  0  -    4  37  278  7.5 
  VGF  182  42  373    16  16  123  7.9    177  40  332  8.3 
  VGD  20  77  675    9  31  245  7.9    19  63  509  8.1 
  FFW  16  222  1,939    4  67  540  8.2    15  219  1,647  7.5 
                           
    Total  262
b  57  498    41
b  24  190  8.0    254
b  53  475  8.9 
Source: FMRSP-IFPRI Bangladesh Flood Impact Survey, 1998–1999. 
Notes: FFE = Food For Education; GR = Gratuitous Relief; VGF = Vulnerable Group Feeding; VGD = Vulnerable Group Development; FFW = Food For Work. 
a Average purchase price of consumes in the same region 








4. IMPACT OF TRANSFERS ON FOOD CONSUMPTION: 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
The empirical calculation of the marginal propensity to consume wheat out of 
wheat transfers has been estimated using two alternative methodologies. First, we use 
propensity score matching (PSM), in which the set of program participant households 
that receive wheat is compared to a set of counterfactual households drawn among 
nonparticipants that “look like” program participants. As an alternative, we use the 
parameters of an econometrically estimated Engel function to calculate the MPC for 
wheat out of income and wheat transfers.  
 
PROPENSITY SCORE MATCHING  
Following recent empirical examples in the estimation of program impact in the 
economic literature (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983; Jalan and Ravallion 2001; Ravallion et 
al. 2001; Dehejia and Wahba 1998, 1999; Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd 1997; Heckman 
et al. 1998; Lechner 1999), we use propensity-score matching (PSM) methods to extract 
from the sample of nonparticipating households a set of matching households that “look 
like” the participating households. The PSM method for the calculation of MPC for 
different groups of households is particularly appropriate in this context, since the 
households were drawn from the same survey and a large number of observable 
characteristics were available to help identify the matching households.
9  
                                                 
9 Nonetheless, bias due to unobservable characteristics that have an impact on program participation cannot 
be ruled out.  
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Ideally, we would compare the level of consumption of program participants to 
that of the same program participants if they had not participated in the program. 
Mathematically, defining R as equal to 1 for program participants and 0 otherwise, Q1 
and Q0 as the amount of wheat consumed by program participants and nonparticipants, 
respectively, we would like to compare E[Q1 | R = 1] to E[Q0 | R = 1].  
The counterfactual group here has been constructed by extracting from the sample 
of nonparticipants a set of matched households using the propensity score 
P(XP) = Prob[R = 1| XP], (the probability of participating in any program that distributed 
wheat), based on a logit model with observable characteristics (XP) as explanatory 
variables (See Appendix Table 13). Two different matched samples were created using 
individual matching and neighborhood matching estimators, though the results below 
show only the neighborhood matching results. 
Figure 2 compares the probability of participation in any program derived from 
the Logit model for participant and nonparticipant groups. With the exception of the 
nonparticipating households with a predicted probability of participation of zero, the 
predicted probability distribution of nonparticipants and participants is similar. The 
marked difference in per capita expenditures in the matched sample compared to 
nonparticipants overall is another indication of the quality of the matching. Monthly per 
capita expenditures for participants are Tk 570, compared to Tk 747 for nonparticipants, 
and Tk 609 for the matched sample. 
Table 7 reports the results of the estimated level of wheat consumption for the 
participating and the matched sample. Considering first, participation in any of the   
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Figure 2—Distribution of predicted probability of program participation: 


















Table 7—Marginal propensity to consume estimates for wheat consumption in 
Bangladesh using propensity score matching, January to April 1999 
  All  VGD  VGF  FFE  FFW 
  (kilograms per household per month) 
           
Consumption of participants  13.887  16.757  14.522  15.855  6.574 
  (0.85)  (5.20)  (0.96)  (2.09)  (1.92) 
           
Consumption of matched nonparticipants  9.619  13.009  8.858  10.737  10.509 
  (2.39)  (2.70)  (1.89)  (2.78)  (2.14) 
           
Difference in consumption  4.268  3.748  5.664  5.118  -3.935 
  (2.54)  (5.85)  (2.12)  (3.55)  (2.04) 
           
Size of the transfer  13.050  17.035  11.132  12.397  47.01 
  (0.93)  (1.83)  (0.54)  (1.49)  (9.57) 
           
Marginal propensity to consume wheat  0.327  0.220  0.509  0.413  -0.084 
           
Number of participants  263  19  177  62  17 
Source: FMRSP-IFPRI Bangladesh Flood Impact Survey, 1998–1999.  
Note: Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. VGD = Vulnerable Group Development; VGF = 

































programs, wheat consumption of participants is 4.27 kilograms per household per month 
greater than the wheat consumption of the matched sample.
10 With an average transfer of 
13.05 kilograms per household per month, the estimated marginal propensity to consume 
wheat out of a wheat transfer is 0.327. Similar calculations for the effects of wheat 
transfers in individual programs result in a range of MPCs from 0.509 for VGF transfers 
and essentially zero (-0.084) for Food For Work. 
As a check on the approximate magnitudes of the MPCs derived above, Table 8 
presents estimates of the MPC for wheat based on a simple, naïve comparison of sample 
 
Table 8—Marginal propensity to consume estimates for wheat consumption in 
Bangladesh using sample means, January to April 1999 
  All  VGD  VGF  FFE  FFW 
  (kilograms per household per month) 
 
Consumption of participants  13.887  16.757  14.522  15.855  6.574 
  (0.85)  (5.20)  (0.96)  (2.09)  (1.92) 
Consumption of nonparticipants  8.974  8.974  8.974  8.974  8.974 
  (0.62)  (0.62)  (0.62)  (0.62)  (0.62) 
Difference in consumption  4.913  7.783  5.548  6.881  -2.400 
  (1.189)  (6.069)  (1.415)  (2.813)  (3.830) 
Size of the transfer  13.050  17.035  11.132  12.397  47.01 
  (0.93)  (1.83)  (0.54)  (1.49)  (9.57) 
Marginal propensity to consume wheat  0.376  0.457  0.498  0.555  -0.051 
           
Number of participants  267  19  177  62  17 
Number of nonparticipants  481  481  481  481  481 
Source: FMRSP-IFPRI Bangladesh Flood Impact Survey, 1998–1999.  
Note: Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. VGD = Vulnerable Group Development; VGF = 
Vulnerable Group Feeding; FFE = Food For Education; FFW = Food For Work. 
 
 
                                                 
10 The standard errors of the mean level of wheat consumption for the matched nonparticipants, reported in 
parentheses, have been calculated bootstrapping the matching procedure and adding an adjustment factor 
that takes into account the number of times a matched value has been associated with a single participant.  
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means of the consumption level of wheat for participants and nonparticipants. In other 
words, the comparison group is not a matched sample, but simply the set of all 
nonparticipants. As before, the MPCs have been calculated as the difference in the 
average level of consumption of wheat of wheat transfer program participants and 
nonparticipants divided by the average level of the wheat transfer. Using these averages 
to directly calculate MPCs for wheat, of course, overlooks potential serious biases, 
including the endogeneity of program participation. The resulting MPCs calculated using 
simple sample means are in general slightly higher than those using the propensity score 
matching. The average MPC for all program participants is equal to 0.372 (compared to 
0.327) with substantially higher MPCs for VGF transfers and FFE transfers.  
 
ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATES OF ENGEL CURVES 
As an alternative to propensity score matching, we also econometrically estimate 
the parameters of an Engel function, using the following functional form:  
 
  w = a0 + a1*HHSIZE + b1*Y + b2*Y
2 + c1*WT + c2*WT
2 + e,  (1) 
 
where w is the budget share of wheat consumption in the month preceding the interview, 
HHSIZE is the household size, Y is total income (expenditure) per household per month 
(less the value of the in-kind transfer), WT is the average monthly value of the wheat 
transfers received by the households since January 15, 1999, and e is the error term,  
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assumed to have a normal distribution. Including the squared terms for Y and WT allows 
for curvature in the relationship between these variables and the budget share.
11  
The estimation of this model required corrections for endogeneity of several 
variables. First, in order to correct for the endogeneity of total expenditures (a proxy for 
household income), we used the fitted value of total expenditures from a regression using 
instrumental variables. Second, because not all households are wheat consumers, we also 
estimated a second equation (Model 2), correcting for selectivity bias using the inverse 
Mills ratio from a probit regression on whether households consume wheat (see Heien 
and Wessells 1990 and Byrne, Capps, and Saha 1996 for a similar approach to estimate 
demand systems with microdata).
12 Third, we corrected for the endogeneity of program 
participation. Here we used the standard treatment effect model (see Green 2000 for 
general references on treatment effect models) in which the regression specified is 
augmented by the inverse Mills ratio calculated using the probability of participating in 
the program. Thus, the appropriate inverse Mills ratio was added as an explanatory 
variable along with dummy variables for individual program participation in Model 3.
13 
Finally, in all regressions, we calculate robust standard errors corrected for cluster 
effects.  
                                                 
11 In an alternative model specification, we also included an interaction term (Y * WT), but the estimated 
coefficient was very small and statistically insignificant. 
12 Note that when all the observations are used in the estimation of the Engel function, the inverse Mills 
ratio is equal to  l = f(B’X)/F(B’X) for consuming households and  l = f(B’X)/(1-F(B’X)) for non-
consuming households. 
13 Here the inverse Mills ratio is equal to  l = f(B’X)/F(B’X) for participating households and 
l = -f(B’X)/(1-F(B’X)) for nonparticipating households.  
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Table 9 shows the regression results. In Model 1, all the coefficients are 
significantly different from zero at the 5 percent confidence level except for the 
coefficient on income squared (Y
2). In Model 2, the coefficient on the inverse Mills ratio 
is also significant, and the explanatory power of the regression is considerably improved 
as evidenced by the increase in R-squared from 0.115 to 0.233.  
The positive sign of c1, the coefficient of the value of wheat transfers (WT), 
together with the negative sign of c2, the coefficient of the squared term (WT
2), indicates 
 
Table 9—Impacts of wheat transfers and cash income on wheat consumption 
Dependent variable: Budget share of monthly household consumption of wheat 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Variables  coefficient  t-test  coefficient  t-test  coefficient  t-test 
             
Constant  3.786  2.500  4.166  5.410  3.413  3.250 
Household Size  0.362  -5.030  0.390  2.730  0.271  1.750 
Tot Hh Expenditure (Pred.)  -0.847  2.270  -0.928  -5.270  -0.619  -2.860 
Square of Tot Hh Expenditure (Pred.)  0.000  4.090  0.000  2.430  0.000  1.220 
Value of Total Wheat Transfer  19.158  -4.020  11.276  1.700  9.185  1.800 
Square of Value of Total Wheat Transfer  -0.015  5.380  -0.010  -2.200  -0.006  -1.710 
Receive VGD          4.924  1.510 
Receive VGF          1.824  1.100 
Receive FFW          -5.112  -2.020 
Receive FFE          1.644  1.650 
Inverse Mills Ratio - Wheat consumption      0.934  2.090  -0.826  -1.290 
Inverse Mills Ratio – VGD          0.429  0.380 
Inverse Mills Ratio – VGF          1.016  0.960 
Inverse Mills Ratio – FFW          1.272  1.170 
Inverse Mills Ratio – FFE          -0.480  -2.690 
             
R2  0.104    0.114    0.163   
Observations  744    744    744   
Number of Clusters  24    24    24   
Source: FMRSP-IFPRI Bangladesh Flood Impact Survey, 1998–1999 and authors’ calculations. 
Notes: Household expenditure and value of transfers are expressed in thousands of taka. VGD = Vulnerable 




that at low levels of transfers, an increase in the transfer tends to increase the budget 
share of wheat, but as the size of the transfer increases, the marginal increase in the share 
of wheat diminishes. Similarly, the negative sign on the coefficient b1, the coefficient of 
the fitted value of total expenditures per household (T), together with the positive sign of 
b2, the coefficient of the squared term, indicates that the budget share of wheat tends to 
decline as income increases, but at a decreasing rate. 
The third regression (Model 3) includes dummy variables for the participation in 
some of the wheat distribution programs: DVGD for the Vulnerable Group Development 
(VGD) program, DVGF for the Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF) program, and DFFW 
for the Food For Work (FFW) program.
14 The coefficients on DVGD and DVGF are 
positive and significant at the 10 percent confidence level, suggesting that the budget 
shares for wheat of VGD and VGF participants are significantly higher than for other 
households, taking into account the other determinants of the wheat budget share 
included in the regression.  
The marginal propensities to consume wheat out of wheat transfers (WT) and cash 
income (Y) can be calculated from the regression equations by taking the partial 
derivatives of the wheat expenditures with respect to WT and YT. Since w = pwqw/(Y + T), 
using equation 1, we have 
 
                                                 
14 We also tested for selection bias in the Food For Work program by including an inverse Mills ratio 
variable estimated from a probit regression of Food For Work participation. The estimated coefficient was 
statistically insignificant. Note that participants in Vulnerable Group Feeding, the program with the most 
participants from our sample, were not self-selected, but rather chosen by local committees on the basis of 
household characteristics including level of poverty and gender of the household head.  
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  pwqw = Y * w = Y * (a0 + a1*HHSIZE + b1*Y + b2*Y
2 + c1*WT + c2*WT
2 + e)  (2) 
 
and  
  d(pwqw)/dYT = w + b1*Y + 2b2*Y
2 = MPC of wheat out of total income.  (3) 
 
Similarly,  
  d(pwqw)/dWT   = w + (Y + WT) * (c1 + 2*c2*WT) 
 
    = MPC of wheat out of wheat transfers.   (4) 
 
 
Using an average monthly household income of wheat recipients of 3,072 taka 
and an average wheat transfer equivalent to 155 taka per month per household, the 
calculated marginal propensity to consume wheat out of wheat transfers is 0.358 using 
the coefficients from Model 2 and 0.216 using the coefficients from Model 3. These 
MPCs show the change in the value of wheat consumption, given a marginal change in 
the value of wheat transfers.  
However, in order to calculate the total change in wheat consumption as a result 
of the wheat transfer programs, we use the regression coefficients to compute “arc” 
MPCs, equal to estimated consumption with the transfer less estimated consumption 
without a transfer, divided by the size of the transfer (Table 10). Using the parameters 
from Model 3 and the average income of households in the lowest income tercile, the 
“arc” marginal propensity to consume wheat out of a small wheat transfer (of 120 taka 
per household per month) ranges from 0.170 to 0.239. For the same programs and 
household income, the “arc” marginal propensity to consume wheat out of a large wheat 
transfer (500 taka per household per month) ranges from only 0.081 to 0.149. Using the 
average total household expenditures of each program’s participants and the average size  
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of transfers in each program, the “arc” marginal propensity to consume ranges from 
0.029 for Food For Work (a program that involves a very large wheat transfer equal to 
650 Taka per household per month) to 0.276 for Vulnerable Group Feeding, a program 
with small transfers targeted to poor women. 
 
Table 10—Marginal propensity to consume (MPC) wheat out of wheat transfers 
and total income, by income level and size of transfer 
  MPC from wheat transfer by program 





               
MPC Model 2               
  Tercile 1, small transfer  0.230  0.233  0.234  0.237  0.234  0.029  0.586 
  Tercile 1, large transfer  0.169  0.172  0.173  0.176  0.173  0.026  0.521 
  Tercile 2, small transfer  0.339  0.342  0.343  0.346  0.343  0.010  0.245 
  Tercile 2, large transfer  0.227  0.230  0.230  0.234  0.231  0.007  0.173 
    Program Means  0.362  0.380  0.256  0.379  0.375  0.003  0.092 
               
MPC Model 3               
  Tercile 1, small transfer  0.236  0.207  0.138  0.208  0.189  0.026  0.525 
  Tercile 1, large transfer  0.167  0.138  0.069  0.139  0.121  0.024  0.481 
  Tercile 2, small transfer  0.324  0.295  0.226  0.296  0.278  0.013  0.317 
  Tercile 2, large transfer  0.204  0.175  0.107  0.177  0.158  0.011  0.266 
    Program Means   0.339  0.327  0.126  0.322  0.302  0.008  0.220 
         
Means used for the calculations         
  Amount of transfer               
    Small transfer  100  100  100  100  100     
    Large transfer  500  500  500  500  500     
    Mean program transfer  154  100  485  119  124     
  Level of total expenditure               
    Tercile 1  1,906  1,906  1,906  1,906  1,906     
    Tercile 2  3,153  3,153  3,153  3,153  3,153     
    Mean program participant  3,589  3,589  3,589  3,589  3,589     
              
Household size  4.35  5.09  5.29  6.17  5.38     
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Notes: VGD = Vulnerable Group Development; VGF = Vulnerable Group Feeding; FFW = Food For 




Note that, in general, the MPCs for wheat transfers are significantly higher than 
the MPCs for total income.
15 Using average incomes of the lowest tercile of households, 
the MPC wheat for an increase in income is only 0.049 with Model 2 and 0.046 with 
Model 3. Thus, small in-kind transfers result in significantly higher wheat consumption 
than do increases in total cash income. The marginal propensity to consume wheat out of 
the large Food For Work transfers for tercile 1 using Model 3 coefficients (0.069) is, 
however, similar in magnitude to the MPC wheat out of cash income (0.024). 
 
5. IMPLICATIONS OF TRANSFER PROGRAMS FOR WHEAT MARKETS 
The higher marginal propensity to consume out of direct food transfers as 
compared to cash transfers has important implications for market prices of wheat. Table 
11 presents estimates of the impact on wheat demand of various distribution programs in 
recent years in Bangladesh. In 1998/99, wheat distribution through the three major 
targeted programs with small ration size (FFE, VGD, and VGF) was relatively high, 
717,000 tons. Using the MPCs calculated with the Propensity Score Matching technique 
(Table 7), we estimate the total estimated increase in wheat demand from these programs 
to be 287,000 tons. Food For Work distribution, with a transfer more than three times the 
average transfer of the small ration size programs, actually reduced wheat demand by 
58,000 tons, however. In 1999/2000 and 2000/01, years with good rice and wheat 
harvests, public wheat distribution through these targeted programs was about half that of 
                                                 
15 The difference between the coefficient on predicted income and the coefficient on wheat transfers in 
Model 3 (Table 10) is statistically significant at the 5 percent confidence interval. The same holds true for 
the difference between the coefficients on the respective squared terms.  
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1998/99. The demand creation impact of the programs is thus correspondingly less: 
105,000 tons for FFE, VGD, and VGF combined, and 82,000 tons including FFW in 
2000/01.  
 




Estimated MPC out 
of wheat transfers
a  Total distribution 
Increase in wheat 
demand 
  (kg/hh/month)    ('000 tons)  ('000 tons) 
     
FFE  22.1  0.413     
  1998/99      227  94 
  1999/00      174  72 
  2000/01      160  66 
         
VGD  23.5  0.220     
  1998/99      193  42 
  1999/00      155  34 
  2000/01      124  27 
         
VGF  15.0  0.509     
  1998/99      297  151 
  1999/00      23  12 
  2000/01      23  12 
         
Subtotal         
  1998/99    0.401  717  287 
  1999/00    0.335  351  117 
  2000/01    0.351  307  105 
         
FFW  77.4  -0.084     
  1998/99      690  -58 
  1999/00      420  -35 
  2000/01      274  -23 
         
Total
b         
  1998/99      1,407  229 
  1999/00      772  82 
  2000/01      581  82 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Notes: FFE = Food For Education; VGD = Vulnerable Group Development; VGF = Vulnerable Group 
Feeding; FFW = Food For Work. 
a The marginal propensities to consume (MPCs) are from Table 7. 





The impact of this additional demand on the wheat market depends on the 
relationship of domestic wheat prices to international (import parity) prices. As shown in 
Figure 3, during the period of the survey, national average wholesale wheat prices were 
approximately equal to the estimated import parity Dhaka (calculated using the price of 
U.S. hard red winter wheat #2 with a 10 percent discount for quality differences), for 
most of 1998/99 and 1999/2000. Private-sector imports these two years were 606,000 and 
724,000 tons, respectively. Because Bangladesh domestic prices were at import parity, 
these programs had no effect on domestic prices in these years; instead, they replaced 
private-sector imports.  
By early 2000, however, successive excellent rice harvests led to substantial 
declines in the domestic price of wheat, as lower rice prices reduced domestic wheat 
demand. Private-sector imports in the first half of 2000 continued, nonetheless, in part 
because lower priced wheat was imported from non-U.S. sources (Australia, Turkey, and 
central Asia).
16 Later in 2000, private-sector imports of wheat essentially stopped, as 
domestic prices of wheat fell substantially below import parity prices.
17 In this new 
market situation, targeted distribution programs did have an impact on domestic prices.  
Table 12 presents estimates of the impacts on domestic prices of some major 
wheat distribution programs in 2000/01. These estimates assume an own-price elasticity 
of wheat demand of –0.82 (from Goletti 1994) and an elasticity of wheat supply  
                                                 
16 Personal communications with private wheat importers. 
17 Some imports of high gluten content wheat used by commercial baking firms continued.  
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Private Sector Imports Natl. Wholesale Price
Import Parity(Dhaka ex:US Gulf) Import Parity(Dhaka ex:Hapur)
Source: FPMU, DAM, MIS DG Food, USDA and CMIE (1998, 1999, 2000). 
Note: Import parity (Dhaka) price is based on US #2 HRW and includes import tariffs. From November 
1998, the carrying cost from Hapur has increased by 1.1 taka/kg to 4.1 taka/kg. 
 
Table 12—Effect of wheat transfer programs on wheat markets in Bangladesh: 
2000/01 


























  ('000 tons)  ('000 tons)  (percent)  (percent)  (percent)  (percent) 
               
FFE  0.413  160  66  6.2%  2.5%  -7.5%  -4.6% 
VGD  0.220  124  27  4.7%  1.0%  -5.8%  -4.6% 
VGF  0.509  23  12  0.8%  0.4%  -1.1%  -0.5% 
Subtotal  0.342  307  105  12.5%  4.0%  -15.6%  -11.4% 
FFW  -0.084  274  -23  11.0%  -0.8%  -12.6%  -13.6% 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
Notes:  FFE = Food For Education; VGD = Vulnerable Group Development; VGF = Vulnerable Group 
Feeding; FFW = Food For Work. 
a The Marginal Propensities to Consume (MPCS) are from Table 7.  
b Total demand (availability) of nonmilling wheat in 2000/01 = 2.760 million tons; production = 2.400 million 
tons; net public wheat distribution = 0.600 million tons, losses equal to 10 percent of production. 
c Assumed own-price elasticity of demand for wheat: -0.82, from Goletti (1994) and own-price elasticity of supply 
of 0.3.  
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(domestic production) of 0.3.
18 As indicated, nonzero MPCs for wheat transfers make a 
significant difference in the price impact of these programs. For example, an increase in 
wheat supply equal in magnitude to the FFE program lowers wheat prices by 6.2 
percent.
19 Increase in wheat demand partially offsets the effect of increased wheat supply, 
however, so that the net effect is a reduction in wheat prices of only 4.7 percent. In total, 
the positive MPCs for the FFE, VGD, and VGF programs reduce the total effect of these 
programs on market prices from –15.6 to –11.4 percent. Assuming more inelastic own-
price elasticities of supply (0.15) and demand (-0.41) that are arguably more 
representative of short-run responses results in larger price impacts of the programs, 
estimates of the price impact of the FFE program rise to –14.4 percent without MPC 
effects and –8.9 percent with MPC effects. Similarly, the total price effect of the FFE, 
VGD, and VGF programs combined increases to –28.8 and –21.5 percent, without and 
with MPC effects, respectively.
20  
These calculations suggest that program channel is an important determinant in 
calculating the impact of net public distribution (distribution less domestic procurement), 
and thus the impact of food aid, on domestic prices and imports. The maximum volume 
of net public foodgrain (from food aid, government commercial imports, and change in 
                                                 
18 Note that this simple model is based on national wheat supply and demand calculated on an annual basis. 
Baulch et al. (1998) have shown that wheat wholesale markets are well integrated across space and time. 
To the extent that the timing and size of the distribution programs is known to market participants, 
estimating the price effects based on annual national distribution of the wheat programs, is a valid 
approximation, particularly for distribution programs that are spread out relatively evenly throughout the 
year. 
19 Note that the percentage changes in price are expressed as a percentage of the simulated price without 
the program(s).  
20 The estimated effects of the programs in 2000/01 without and with the MPC effect are –11.3 and –9.0 
percent, respectively, for VGD, –2.2 and –1.1 percent for VGF, and –23.7 and –25.3 percent for FFW.  
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public stocks) that can be distributed without depressing market prices below import 
parity levels depends on the level of international prices, the domestic price of rice, and 
the distribution channel.
21 In the early 1990s, the maximum “safe” level of food aid 
(assuming no government commercial imports or change in public stocks) was on the 
order of 600,000 to 800,000 tons (Dorosh 2000). The estimated 120,000-ton increase in 
wheat demand due to the positive MPCs in the small ration channels (FFE, VGD, and 




This paper has presented evidence that the marginal propensity to consume 
(MPC) wheat out of wheat transfers is significantly higher than the MPC wheat out of 
income, and that this addition to demand is large enough to potentially have significant 
effects on market prices. Using propensity score matching techniques, the MPC for wheat 
is, on average, 0.33, ranging from essentially zero for Food For Work (a program with 
large transfers) to 0.51 for VGF. Similarly, using a functional form that allows for 
differences in MPCs according to size of transfers and income levels, regression results 
indicate that the total MPC wheat out of small wheat transfers (15 to 25 kilograms per 
household per month) is approximately 0.30. Thus, small wheat transfers do not lead to 
an equivalent increase in consumption, but are partially offset by lower purchases of 
                                                 
21 Dorosh and Haggblade (1997) use a multi-market model to analyze the implications of the timing of 
food distribution on seasonal market prices. 
22 See Dorosh et al. 2002 for an analysis of the impact of food aid in Bangladesh under various world price, 
production, and policy scenarios.  
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wheat (and to a lesser extent, sales of transfer wheat). Programs that involve larger 
transfers of wheat, such as Food For Work, have much smaller MPCs, however.  
The econometric evidence suggests that increases in cash incomes (and cash 
transfers) do not lead to significant increases in wheat consumption. Calculated MPCs for 
wheat out of cash income range are near zero. Overall, programs involving small rations 
of direct transfers in wheat (FFE, VGD, and VGF) are estimated to have increased wheat 
demand by 287,000 tons in 1998/99 from their transfer of 717,000 tons. Cash transfers of 
an equivalent value would likely have resulted in only a very small increase (or possibly 
even a decrease) in wheat demand. Thus, the potential impact of these wheat transfer 
programs on market prices (when prices are below import parity) is approximately only 
two-thirds the magnitude of the impact of cash transfer programs (and a release of the 
same amount of wheat in the market). The demand-enhancing effect of direct distribution 
in small rations does not necessarily imply that targeted direct distribution programs are 
preferable to other programs or open market sales, however, since other factors, including 
cost of delivery, efficiency of targeting and policy objectives, are also important 
determinants of policy choice.  
Further analysis is needed to explain the reasons behind the varying MPCs in 
terms of the opportunity costs of households’ time, stigma effects, and other factors. 
Nonetheless, the econometric analysis of the survey data presented in this paper clearly 
indicates that in-kind transfers targeted to poor women and children in Bangladesh lead 
to greater wheat consumption than would result from an equivalent increase in cash 
income. Moreover, this increased marginal propensity to consume wheat from wheat  
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transfers is large enough to have significant implications for wheat consumption, market 






Table 13—Results of the Logit participation model 
Dependent variable: Receiving wheat transfers 
Variables  Coefficient  z 
Household size  -0.525  -3.15 
Age hh head  0.003  0.42 
Female head of household  1.355  2.98 
Dependency ratio  -0.022  -3.86 
Male education: none  0.842  4.44 
Male education: primary  0.880  4.42 
Male education: primary completed  0.711  3.11 
Male education: secondary  0.721  2.81 
Male education: secondary completed  -0.515  -0.73 
Fem. education: none  0.739  3.87 
Fem. education: primary  0.746  3.67 
Fem. education: primary completed  0.663  2.77 
Fem. education: secondary  -0.167  -0.46 
No people working as dependent  -0.168  -0.83 
No people working as daily labor  -0.212  -1.25 
No people working on own farm  -0.398  -2.00 
N working in business  -0.270  -1.57 
Total value of assets in ’97  -0.006  -3.44 
Amount of credit in ’97  -0.527  -1.61 
House with tin roof  -1.140  -3.94 
Electricity  -0.162  -0.53 
Dummy for thana 2  1.309  2.79 
Dummy for thana 3  1.016  1.76 
Dummy for thana 4  1.357  2.42 
Dummy for thana 5  1.114  2.32 
Dummy for thana 6  0.160  0.38 
Dummy for thana 7  1.185  2.51 
Log price index: rice  0.994  1.55 
Log price index: wheat  -3.004  -3.40 
Log price index: o. cereals  -0.089  -0.27 
Log price index: pulses  -0.130  -0.22 
Log price index: oil  -0.693  -1.44 
Log price index: vegetables  0.515  0.89 
Log price index: meat  0.530  1.11 
Log price index: eggs  0.304  0.98 
Log price index: milk  -0.082  -0.13 
Log price index: fruit  0.152  0.73 
Log price index: fish  -0.027  -0.10 
Log price index: spices  -0.501  -0.88 
Log price index: snacks  -0.063  -0.19 
Log price index: tea  -0.086  -0.30 
Log price index: prepared food  -0.542  -1.39 
Constant  -1.268  -2.21 
 
Number of observations = 734 
LR chi2(42) = 167.34 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 = 0.1741 
  
 
Table 14—Results of the estimations of the predicted income (expenditure) and participation probit models 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  Y  Y2  Rec. wheat  DVGD  DVGF  DFFW  DFFE  Con. wheat 
Household size  541.53  6,900,376.21  -0.26  -0.45  -0.24  -0.04  -0.02  0.18 
  (6.80)**  (3.98)**  (3.50)**  (1.84)+  (3.08)**  -0.17  -0.1  (2.11)* 
Age hh head  4.10  -42,931.67  0  0.04  0  0  0.01  0.01 
  (-0.76)  (-0.37  (-0.08  (2.74)**  (-0.66  (-0.03  (-0.61  (-1.10) 
Dependency ratio  -6.9  -91,825.96  -0.01  -0.02  -0.01  0  0  0.01 
  (1.86)+  -1.14  (3.64)**  (2.36)*  (2.77)**  -0.09  -0.58  (3.32)**
Male education: None  11.69  542,007.13  0.45  0.75  0.37  -0.06  0.14  -0.25 
  (-0.12)  -0.25  (5.04)**  (2.29)*  (3.94)**  -0.22  -0.8  (2.16)* 
Male education: primary  0.43  -562,186.29  0.45  0.05  0.37  0.09  0.31  -0.24 
  0  -0.24  (4.66)**  -0.18  (3.56)**  -0.31  -1.56  (1.88)+ 
Male education: primary completed  79.99  -1,662,761.69  0.39  0.98  0.27  0.16  0.15  -0.21 
  -0.63  -0.6  (3.32)**  (2.25)*  (2.16)*  -0.51  -0.63  -1.59 
Male education: secondary  311.11  74,480.16  0.34  -0.28  0.32    0.15  -0.29 
  (2.27)*  -0.02  (2.57)*  -0.48  (2.26)*    -0.56  (2.19)* 
Male education: secondary completed  355.14  -7,969,496.31  -0.45    -0.23      0.09 
  -1.47  -1.51  -1.15    -0.61      -0.38 
Fem. education: None  -167.46  -2,240,687.10  0.37  0.5  0.3  0.08  0.07  -0.31 
  (1.72)+  -1.05  (4.14)**  (1.79)+  (3.20)**  -0.31  -0.41  (2.86)**
Fem. education: primary  -173.18  -4,659,662.20  0.4  -0.09  0.29  -0.07  0.55  -0.24 
  -1.53  (1.89)+  (4.02)**  -0.25  (2.78)**  -0.24  (2.67)**  (1.95)+ 
Fem. education: primary completed  290.85  7,870,797.87  0.34  0.57  0.26  -0.07  0.01  -0.18 
  (2.13)*  (2.64)**  (2.76)**  -1.45  (1.99)*  -0.15  -0.05  -1.31 
Fem. education: secondary  536.92  10,503,744.85  -0.16  0.17  -0.14  0.33  -0.5  -0.28 
  (2.93)**  (2.63)**  -0.78  -0.19  -0.64  -0.49  -1.05  (1.68)+ 
Fem. education: secondary completed  -919.05  -44,995,969.30            -0.44 
  -1.2  (2.69)**            -0.54 
No people working as dependent  81.38  -1,112,011.09  -0.24  -0.34  -0.09  0.03  -0.3  0.07 
  -0.67  -0.42  (2.09)*  -0.95  -0.74  -0.1  -0.92  -0.63 
No people working as daily labor  -212.09  -2,087,891.83  -0.15  -0.27  -0.2  0.24  0.31  0.17 
  (1.81)+  -0.82  -1.54  -0.74  (1.92)+  -1.13  -1.61  -1.53 
No people working on own farm  144.74  728,123.18  -0.27  -1.56  -0.2  0.09  0.34  0.23 
  -1.13  -0.26  (2.35)*  (2.25)*  -1.63  -0.28  -1.55  (1.71)+ 
N working in business  137.17  476,158.71  -0.17  -0.03  -0.12  0.07  0.23  -0.06 
  -1.18  -0.19  (1.75)+  -0.1  -1.17  -0.26  -1.3  -0.52 
          (continued) 





Table 14 (continued)           
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  Y  Y2  Rec. wheat  DVGD  DVGF  DFFW  DFFE  Con. wheat 
Total value of assets in '97  5.54  155,292.69  0  0  0  -0.01  0  0 
  (11.16)**  (14.35)**  (3.47)**  -0.3  (2.60)**  -1.46  -0.75  (2.53)* 
Amount of credit in =97  368.93  3,632,361.92  -0.19  0.34  -0.26    -0.24  0 
  (1.67)+  -0.75  -0.98  -0.65  -1.25    -0.61  0 
House with tin roof  406.24  928,155.51  -0.56  0.55  -0.73  0.38  0.19  0.31 
  (2.34)*  -0.25  (3.42)**  -1.04  (3.88)**  -0.87  -0.55  -1.61 
Electricity  1,136.08  10,224,033.13  -0.1    -0.05  0.43  -0.74  0.19 
  (5.95)**  (2.46)*  -0.52    -0.26  -0.81  -1.09  -1.09 
Dummy for thana 2  -1,407.64  -32,082,067.31  0.23  7.94  0.52  -0.96    2.79 
  (1.80)+  (1.89)+  -1.06  (.)  (2.27)*  (1.69)+    (3.49)**
Dummy for thana 3  -1,501.11  -32,210,198.58  0.37  8.67  0.26  -0.75  1.89  3.73 
  (2.04)*  (2.01)*  (1.69)+  (13.60)**  -1.1  -1.38  (2.03)*  (4.60)**
Dummy for thana 4  -469.27  -20,260,243.42  0.25    0.32  -0.22  -2.41  3.1 
  -0.43  -0.86  -0.76    -0.94  -0.19  (1.87)+  (2.83)**
Dummy for thana 5  -1,642.48  -24,027,444.56  0.58  6.74  0.41  -0.53  -0.11  2.23 
  (2.51)*  (1.68)+  (2.37)*  (7.19)**  -1.55  -0.91  -0.17  (3.35)**
Dummy for thana 6  -335.49  -11,654,729.98  -0.06    1.03      2.33 
  -0.51  -0.81  -0.17    (3.02)**      (3.47)**
Dummy for thana 7  -1,288.14  -35,240,233.74  0    0.72  -1.03    3.11 
  -1.22  -1.53  -0.01    (2.82)**  -1.55    (2.91)**
Union level shops Nov '98  -2.9  -41,870.19            0 
  -1.22  -0.81            -1.12 
Union level traders Nov '98  3.96  45,585.00            0.01 
  -1.61  -0.85            (3.47)**
Union level factories Nov '98  -319.42  -5,827,055.17            0.35 
  -1.63  -1.36            (1.86)+ 
Union level poultry farms Nov '98  161.63  3,654,618.24            -0.2 
  -1.31  -1.36            (1.73)+ 
Union level shops Apr '99  5.7  110,207.52            0 
  (2.05)*  (1.82)+            -0.04 
Union level traders Apr '99  -5.79  -74,921.25            -0.01 
  (1.90)+  -1.13            (2.92)**
Union level factories Apr '99  323.47  5,603,218.71            -0.35 
  -1.48  -1.18            (1.65)+ 
          (continued) 





Table 14 (continued)           
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  Y  Y2  Rec. 
wheat 
DVGD  DVGF  DFFW  DFFE  Con. wheat 
Union level poultry farms Apr '99  -178.05  -4,241,610.97            0.24 
  -1.27  -1.39            (1.79)+ 
Union level wage Nov '98  8.56  29,349.81            0 
  -0.53  -0.08            -0.3 
Union level wage Apr '99  -6.35  -124,452.64            0.02 
  -0.35  -0.32            -1.03 
Female head of household      0.85  1.22  0.51    0.88   
      (3.21)**  (1.92)+  (1.93)+    -1.2   
Log price index: rice                -0.02 
                -0.04 
Log price index: wheat                -0.31 
                -0.49 
Log price index: o. cereals                0.17 
                -0.78 
Log price index: pulses                0.37 
                -0.91 
Log price index: oil                0.48 
                -1.58 
Log price index: vegetables                1.08 
                (2.72)**
Log price index: meat                0.35 
                -1.09 
Log price index: eggs                0.01 
                -0.04 
Log price index: milk                -0.12 
                -0.29 
Log price index: fruit                0.26 
                (1.85)+ 
Log price index: fish                -0.01 
                -0.07 
Log price index: spices                0.72 
                (1.94)+ 
Log price index: snacks                -0.07 
                -0.3 
              (continued)  





Table 14 (continued)           
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  Y  Y2  Rec. wheat  DVGD  DVGF  DFFW  DFFE  Con. wheat 
Log price index: tea                -0.13 
                -0.69 
Log price index: prepared food                -0.54 
                (1.99)* 
Receiving wheat transfers                1.86 
                (3.13)**
Lambda 1                -0.72 
                (1.98)* 
Union level programs Nov '98      0  0  0  0  0   
      (1.92)+  -1.02  -0.17  -0.41  (3.41)**   
Union level emergency prog Nov '98      0  0  0  0  0   
      -1.31  -0.77  -0.29  -0.77  -0.48   
Union level programs Apr '99      0  0  0  0  0   
      -0.65  -1.16  (1.73)+  -1.01  (2.93)**   
Union level emergency prog Apr '99      0  0  0  0  0   
      -0.68  -1.38  (2.14)*  -0.52  -1.12   
Moderately flood exposed      0.39  -0.17  0.35  0.06  -0.39   
      (2.40)*  -0.32  (1.99)*  -0.13  -1.03   
Very severely flood exposed      0.4  0.65  0.4  0.24  0.23   
      (2.17)*  -1.03  (2.11)*  -0.5  -0.54   
Severely flood exposed      0.4    0.46  0.34  0   
      (2.39)*    (2.63)**  -0.78  -0.01   
Constant  1,011.80  9,762,194.71  -1.01  -9.02  -1.05  -1.04  -5.9  -4.38 
  -0.5  -0.22  (2.81)**  (6.33)**  (2.69)**  -1.29  (3.57)**  (2.21)* 
                 
Observations    744  744  739  296  739  414  398 739 
  R-squared  0.65  0.49             
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